The specification, design, and assurance of safety encompasses various concepts and best practices, subject of reuse in form of patterns. This work summarizes applied research on such concepts and practices with a focus on the last two decades and on the state-of-the-art of patterns in safety-critical system design and assurance argumentation. We investigate several aspects of such patterns, for example, where and when they are applied, their characteristics and purposes, and how they are related. For each aspect, we provide an overview of relevant studies and synthesize a taxonomy of first principles underlying these patterns. Furthermore, we comment on how these studies address known challenges and we discuss suggestions for further research. Our findings disclose a lack of research on how patterns improve system safety claims and, vice versa, on the decomposition of system safety into separated local concerns, and on the impact of security on safety.
INTRODUCTION
Safety is an indisputably critical and strongly desirable property of engineered systems as operated in their designated environments [Leveson 2012; McDermid 1991] . The assurance of this property remains a critical activity throughout the life cycle of such systems. The procedure and the key elements of safety engineering are reflected in generic and domain-specific methods, techniques, and standards.
Background
This section highlights important concepts in safety assurance, introduces the terminology used below, and summarizes core aspects of design and argument patterns used in safety assurance.
1.1.1 Systems and Safety. Consider an engineered physical system operated in a domestic, urban, or industrial environment, for example, an autonomous mobile robot carrying through tasks in a warehouse-for the sake of discussing a recent application domain.
By system safety (safety for short), we refer to the extent to which such a system is free of hazards, that is, of risks of physical harm for humans, the environment, the system itself, and other usually physical assets [Burns et al. 1992; Leveson 2012; Lund et al. 2011] . In the robot example, such hazards could involve collisions of the robot with obstacles, the robot falling down the stairs, the robot dumping down valuables, or the robot having an internal component failure or getting malicious or erroneous control inputs potentially triggering one of the previous risks.
One way of classifying failures is to distinguish systematic from random causes. Systematic faults are associated with development mistakes leading to wrong specifications, designs, or implementations. Materials such as, for example, mechanical, electrical, and electronic components exhibit random faults because of aging, degradation, or electromagnetic radiation. According to a widespread view, random behavior of software can only result from random inputs or faults in the electronic hardware the software is running on. We will use the term fault in this study, although many of the discussions apply to the terms error and failure, that is, undesired higher-level or downstream events caused by faults [Avizienis et al. 2004; Laprie 1992] .
Overall, system safety is about handling critical events and their possible undesired consequences. Risk analysis as one step towards handling such events deals with the estimation of risk levels (also: risk priority) of these events, that is, abstractions of the expected loss or cost resulting from these events. Domain-specific risk classifiers (also: risk matrices) help safety analysts to rank risks usually by estimating and combining two parameters, probability of occurrence and severity of consequence.
In regulations (e.g. in the United Kingdom and in Australia), an engineered system is considered safe if all relevant risks have been reduced to a tolerable level, that is, a level at which the cost of further risk reduction measures would be grossly disproportionate to their benefit.
Engineering
Steps. The robot example indicates the many dimensions of system safety and its tight relationship to other disciplines, for example, IT security. Safety assurance considers the whole life cycle of a system (i.e., the system as specified, designed, implemented, operated, and decommissioned) as the primary source, root cause, or amplifier of such risk and as the subject of assurance. The system as operated is the most tangible assurance object.
In a typical life cycle, we distinguish the engineering steps of specification, design, implementation, and assurance. The left part of Figure 1 depicts the artifacts crafted in these steps. For specification, the artifact "specification" is crafted by the activity "requirements engineering." For design, the artifact "system design" is crafted by the corresponding "software and systems engineering" activity. We distinguish two main abstractions used to model designs: behavior and decomposition. Implementation can be seen as a revision and refinement of what is already there: the design. The right part of Figure 1 depicts the facets of assurance (blue arcs). These facets usually comprise
• meeting the safety specification by guaranteeing reachability and invariance (the refines-arc),
• fault-avoidance and fault-tolerance (the transformation-arc to "enhanced decomposition," "safe behavior, " and "safety specification, " driven by system-level hazard analysis), • guidance from standards (all blue arcs), • case-based argumentation from verification, validation, and testing (all blue arcs).
Figure 1 describes assurance as the argument (blue arcs) that a consistently safety-enhanced implementation is a refinement of a consistently safety-enhanced design which itself is a refinement of a consistent safety specification.
1.1.3 Patterns, Pattern Categories, Abstraction, and Tactics. Models used in engineering-such as specifications, architectures, or designs-are, if they address a common problem, candidates for reuse [Kramer 2007 ]. We refer to such abstractions as patterns. In this work, design and argument patterns denote general solutions for common problems recurring in the construction and assurance practice of safety-critical systems.
The effective reusability of a pattern depends on the quality of its documentation. In civil architecture [Alexander et al. 1977] and later in software engineering [Gamma et al. 1993] , researchers started to extract patterns from various sources and to catalog them using templates and models.
Templates help in collecting general information from the recurrences of a pattern such as, for example, the context of use, the problem addressed, the solution, the consequences of use, given names, underlying principles. Models are useful to capture technical details with a more expressive language (e.g. temporal logic, labeled transition system) and a standard notation (e.g. the Unified Modeling Language or the Goal Structuring Notation). 1 Based on the artifacts and relationships in Figure 1 , we distinguish the following categories of patterns:
Specifications reflect practices to specify (e.g. using domain-specific language [Dwyer et al. 1999] ) and decompose (e.g. using contracts [Meyer 1992 ]) safety requirements. Contracts form a practical way of including assumptions about the environment of a system into a specification. For example, van Lamsweerde [2009] provides a framework to construct specifications based on this idea. Designs comprise two interrelated abstractions: (interface) behavior and (architectural) decomposition.
Behaviors describe safety concepts expressed in terms of a behavior model, for example, a state machine encoding how a specific system is controlled to efficiently leave a dangerous situation or to enter a safe state. If such behaviors are expressed with respect to the overall system-sharing the interface with the assets to be protected in the environment-then a corresponding contract can be formulated. Decompositions represent reusable design practices to increase safety. Such practices range from cross-disciplinary or mechatronic architecture design to implementation in software, electronic, and mechanical hardware. Common across these technologies is a particular decomposition to implement principles such as, for example, monitoring, fault detection, redundancy, or recovery [Knight 2012] . Such principles reduce the range of choices for design decisions and are also known as architectural tactics [Wu and Kelly 2004] . Procedures deal with the steps of the engineering process required to perform safety design and assurance.
Transformations cover the work steps of creating and changing engineering artifacts, for example, the hardening of an architecture, the corresponding update of a fault tree, or the refinement of a specification.
Arguments cover analysis and assessment practices to justify an acceptable level of safety of the considered system in a specific operational environment [Kelly and McDermid 1998; McDermid 1994] . Such arguments are used to establish claims, for example, of the form "System S is free of hazard H , " "Development process of system S complies with standard X ," or "Argument A is sufficiently confident." The first one is also called a product-based argument (e.g. constructed during formal verification), the second one is a process-based argument (in this case, a compliance argument), and the third one is a meta-argument (in this case, a confidence argument). Luo et al. [2016] provide a corresponding taxonomy. Such patterns reoccur in many of the collaborating branches of safety engineering. They are also part of widely used standards (e.g. IEC 61508) and have received frequent attention in the scientific literature.
1.1.4 Terminology. Subtle differences between a specification and a specification pattern or between an argument and an argument pattern are not essential for this survey. However, reusable specifications and arguments should be documented along with certain abstractions such as, for example, type parameters, variation or extension points. This survey is not about general software and hardware patterns. For the sake of simplicity, we treat the terms hazard and (safety) risk as synonyms. Furthermore, we treat safety cases, or in general, assurance cases as synonyms to assurance arguments. However, an argument is to be viewed distinctly from its representation, for example, a goal structure that visualizes the argument. According to Hoare [1985] , we view an implementation as a final and executable refinement of a corresponding specification. safety can be rephrased into a composite of component properties. Rushby [1994] discusses critical properties from several viewpoints. We will revisit these kinds of properties below.
Common to such properties is that their meanings depend on the perimeter, scope, boundary, or interface and the chosen abstraction they are specified for. For hazard analysis, this perimeter is usually congruent with the overall system. Consequently, a system safety property specifies behavior at the system level.
1.1.6 Relationships between Patterns. The thick blue arcs in Figure 1 depict three desirable relationships among patterns of the mentioned categories:
Compositions and Behaviors express Designs Figure 1 already suggests that we take the view of a design having a behavioral and a structural facet (e.g. [Broy 2011]) . Both facets can be expressed in models. If both models are given, we expect them to be consistent. Arguments and Transformations express Procedures Arguments capture reasoning steps from assurance evidence (e.g. proofs, validation reports, test verdicts) towards assurance claims (e.g. safety specifications). Transformations capture engineering steps. We view arguments and transformations as procedures inasmuch as they incorporate work steps (i.e., reasoning and construction steps) to be accomplished by engineers. Behaviors refine Specifications If a system design is given in terms of a behavior, we want it to fulfill the corresponding safety specification, in other words, we want it to be a refinement of this specification. Compositions refine Behaviors refine Specifications If a system design is given in terms of an architecture, a particular decomposition into components, two relationships are desirable: First, if a behavior is explicitly given, the behavior emerging from the composition should be consistent with (possibly, a refinement of) the explicitly given behavior. Second, this composition should be refinement of the corresponding safety specification. Broy [2011] gives a more comprehensive formal account of these relationships. After transforming a composition into another composition enhanced by principles such as, for example, recovery (see, e.g. [Randell 1975 ]), we desire that the mentioned relationships are maintained or established.
1.1.7 Between Specifications and Arguments. Given a specification and a design according to the left part of Figure 1 , safety engineers are interested in arguments for two claims and measures if no arguments can be found for the current versions of the artifacts (right part of Figure 1 ):
The specification does not imply relevant hazards. If no argument can be found, the specification has to be transformed into a safety specification ruling out all relevant hazards. A safety specification typically includes invariants requiring the system to stay within safe regions (see, e.g. [Leveson 2012; Rushby 1994] ). Such transformations can require the construction of a design as discussed next.
The design is safe. This claim can be rephrased into the claim that the design is a refinement of the safety specification. Such a refinement holds if and only if the weakest precondition for the design to fulfill the safety specification is different from false. However, if no such argument can be found, the design has to be transformed into a safety-enhanced design. This transformation has to be consistently performed if the design is given in terms of both artifacts.
1.1.8 Between Specifications and Behaviors. The behavioral perspective gives rise to behavioral tactics such as prevention or active safety, passive safety, and fail-safe (e.g. [Knight 2012]) . The latter represents the transition of a system to a safe state in the event of failure. The fail-safe tactic can be divided into the fail-silent tactic (i.e., transition to a safe state by excluding failing components from the system functionality) and the fail-operational tactic (i.e., transition to a safe state maintaining the original system functionality).
For any system and for each of its components, we can specify dependability and security properties [Avizienis et al. 2004; Laprie 1992] . As mentioned before, safety can be seen as a property emerging from a system or to be entailed by the compound behavior of its components. This phenomenon can be investigated using formal notions of properties such as, for example, safety, liveness, reliability, and availability. Lamport [1977] formally discusses two distinct behavioral properties of systems:
• Safety properties state that something bad will never happen.
• Liveness properties state that something good will eventually happen.
Alpern and Schneider [1987] show that all behavioral properties can be decomposed into a safety and a liveness part with the obligation to proof invariance for safety and well-foundedness for liveness of a specific system. In concurrent systems with constrained resources, one also needs to prove fairness properties, that is, the property that each of a set of components will infinitely often be able to be productive if they wish to do so. Hence, fairness is a special form of liveness. Avizienis et al. [2004] qualitatively characterize reliability as the "continuity of correct service. " Knight [2012] and Bertsche et al. [2009] use two related definitions of reliability: the "probability that the system will operate correctly [...] up until time t" and the "mean time to the first (between two) failure(s). " One can rephrase the latter into the following requirement:
The mean number of steps of system S to the first "bad thing" (between two "bad things") is greater than n. If we substitute "mean" by "minimum" and let n = ∞, we get a safety property. The strength or weakness of a property corresponds to the strength or weakness of its proof obligations. Hence, the requirement above suggests that proof obligations for reliability requirements are in general weaker than proof obligations for formal safety properties. Consequently, reliability properties are in general weaker than safety properties.
Although we can find qualitative abstractions of probabilistic phenomena, reliability practitioners are usually interested in the quantitative assessment of a system, particularly, in uncertainty factors of technologies (e.g. material degradation and electromagnetic interference causing random failures) and development processes (e.g. developer mistakes causing systematic failures). For example, Littlewood and Rushby [2012] discuss stochastic process models to calculate the probability of failure on demand of a system with a specific form of diverse redundancy. Further reliability and availability metrics include, for example, mean time between failure. Software defects can be considered as systematic if they are deployed in the system as operated. Hence, Littlewood [1991] use stochastic process models to predict the probability of development defects occurring during system use.
The introduced reliability definitions indicate the difference between non-repairable and repairable systems. Repairable systems give rise to the discussion of availability, that is, "the probability that the system will be operational at time t" [Knight 2012, 2.7.2] or its complement, the probability of failure on demand. From Lamport's perspective, a repairable system with non-zero availability would fulfill the two liveness properties "not always bad" and "always eventually good. "
Let us now look at the relationship of safety and security: Avizienis et al. [2004] define security as a composite of integrity (i.e., the absence of unauthorized influence), confidentiality (i.e., the absence of unauthorized access), and availability on demand of authorized actions. Unauthorized actions are the "bad things" that have to be reduced, or avoided if seen as a formal safety property. Burns et al. [1992] distinguish between an absolute and a relative "degree of harm" (also "severity of consequence") to discriminate between safety (absolute harm) and security (relative harm):
" [A] service is judged to be security-critical in a given context if its behavior could be sufficient to cause relative harm, but never sufficient to cause absolute harm, to resources for which the enterprise operating the service has responsibility. " The notions of Burns et al. [1992] and Avizienis et al. [2004] can be unified by a common principle:
The protection of an asset from an undesired event caused by an agent. Proving the avoidance of the undesired event for a system amounts to proving a formal safety property of this system. For security, the assets would be represented by "information" or "method calls", the undesired event by "unauthorized access or influence through exploiting vulnerabilities, " and the agent by an "attacker. " For safety, the assets would be represented by "humans", "animals", or "the environment, " the undesired event by "getting harmed", and the agent by "the system under consideration. " Below, we assume that designs can be specified with the discussed properties.
Objective of this Survey
We are interested in the characteristics of safety patterns and their variety across several disciplines involved in safety engineering such as, for example, software engineering, mechatronics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and human factors engineering. With this survey, we aim at answering the question:
What is the state-of-the-art of design and argument patterns for the assurance of system safety? Table 1 decomposes this question into twelve survey questions. By answering these questions, we aim at understanding various aspects of patterns, the relationships between these patterns, their properties and composition, and the relationships to their first principles.
Preliminary Work and Survey Method
For this survey, we first explored the field by an annotated bibliography according to Knott [2015] . Intermediate results are reported in [Gleirscher and Kugele 2016] . A coverage analysis based on challenges from Cant [2013] ; Graydon [2015 Graydon [ , 2017 ; Langari and Maibaum [2013] 2.12
For a more comprehensive overview of literature on safety patterns and to determine research directions, we created a systematic map along the lines of Petersen et al. [2008] . We selected the most relevant studies by summed ranking of relevance. For each selected study, we answered the survey questions in Section 1.2. Some questions (e.g. qTactic) involved qualitative content analysis [Neuendorf 2016] , that is, content abstraction by assignment of keywords to the studies and further analysis based on these keywords.
Related Work
In this section, we summarize literature studies on design and argument patterns and studies of corresponding pattern taxonomies.
Literature Studies and Pattern Catalogs. Preschern et al. [2014b] discuss twelve safety-related pattern-based methods regarding their target domain, the involved types of patterns (i.e., process, safety tactics, architecture, timing), and the degree of detail. Their focus lies on pattern application and use in the safety process. The authors state that they could not find a similar study on safety patterns and their application. We complement their study with an extended analysis of pattern types and relationships. Luo et al. [2016] discuss a taxonomy of safety cases to map literature on argument patterns and to establish a similarity relation among safety cases. In their work, four argument types are distinguished: product-based arguments, process-based arguments, compliance arguments, and confidence arguments. The authors observe a lack of research on confidence arguments. Our work extends and embeds their survey into a larger context. Moreover, we use their taxonomy below (cf. Table 6 in Section 2.5). Szczygielska and Jarzebowicz [2017] present an on-line argument pattern catalog extracted from literature on argument patterns. 45 patterns were modeled and can be instantiated from this catalog during the construction of specific assurance cases. While their catalog exceeds the list of patterns we discuss in Table 6 , our contribution lies in establishing relationships among arguments and between arguments and designs. Langari and Maibaum [2013] summarize challenges to be addressed by research on assurance cases and to be taken into account in future standards and regulations recommending assurance cases. These challenges include the identification of fallacious reasoning in arguments (e.g. confirmation bias), argument completeness, the specification of assumptions, the reduction of argument size and complexity, and the achievement of readability. We extend Langari and Maibaum's work by identifying further research to solving these challenges. We explore the state of the art, how far research has come in addressing such challenges, as well as interesting research gaps.
Havârneanu et al. [2015] summarize behavioral safety tactics resulting from accident research in the railway domain, viewing railways as a socio-technical system [Leveson 2012 ]. The authors summarize measures for the prevention of trespass accidents, for example, barriers, organizational measures, monitoring, enforcement, track design, staff training, station lighting, and rail traffic management. Our study takes an engineering perspective on designs and arguments and, moreover, abstracts from prevention measures of a specific domain. Kakamanshadi et al. [2015] summarize research on fault-tolerance mechanisms for resilient and reliable wireless sensor networks. These mechanisms are based on redundancy of nodes, paths, data, and time; on clustering to reduce performance bottlenecks, and on optimal deployment. Taking a more general view, our survey can help to bridge the gap between network reliability and performance and the concepts required in safety-critical applications relying on such networks.
Tactic Taxonomies. Kumar and Prabhakar [2010] provide a framework for developing taxonomies such as the ones for safety patterns discussed by Wu and Kelly [2004] and Preschern et al. [2013a] . Ryoo et al. [2012] describe the extraction and revision of tactic hierarchies for the consolidation of pattern catalogs. Their application to security tactics provides insight on how safety and security patterns could be aligned on a tactics level. Hawkins and Kelly [2012] show guidance on the construction of safety arguments, enumerating principles helpful for the choice of argument patterns. Our analyses in the Sections 2.5 and 2.7 are based on these works.
Contributions and Outline
We present a survey of reusable concepts for the specification, design, and assurance of safetycritical systems. Based on the survey questions presented in Table 1 , we classify a range of studies of such concepts by their application domains, type of mitigated risk, the supported engineering steps, their first principles, and their abstractions. From a cross-disciplinary perspective, this survey provides information
• to identify relevant contributions to this field,
• about the range of safety-enhanced designs and assurance arguments,
• to develop a unified view of reusable designs and arguments, and • to identify directions for further research.
With this study, we contribute to the consolidation of the practical safety engineering body of knowledge. Based on preliminary materials in [Gleirscher and Kugele 2016] and on the systematic map according to [Petersen et al. 2008 ] (Section 1.3), this survey forms a systematic literature review according to Kitchenham [2007] . The rest of this work is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the answers to the survey questions. Section 3 discusses these answers, derives recommendations for future research (Section 3), and discloses limitations of our study (Section 3.8). We draw final conclusions in Section 4.
ASPECTS OF DESIGN AND ARGUMENT PATTERNS FOR SAFETY ASSURANCE
The following sections provide answers to the survey questions as introduced in Table 1. 2.1 qApplication: Which applications are discussed to demonstrate the patterns? Table 2 lists the most relevant studies by application domain. The surveyed studies cover application domains such as, for example, process plants, machinery, automotive, and avionic systems. Many studies present generically applicable patterns. Across the mentioned domains, our survey focuses on pattern applications for the design and assurance of embedded control systems and distributed systems.
2.2 qMitigated Risk: Which types of risk are handled by the discussed patterns? Table 3 is organized according to frequently discussed types of risk including its causal origin or location of occurrence. The surveyed studies deal with the reduction of various technical defects and the reduction of complexity. The presented approaches handle such risks by measures built from several technologies (i.e., software, electronic hardware, mechanical hardware). The investigations deal with risks stemming, for example, from the system as a whole, purely from software, purely from hardware, from requirements and system design, from arguments, from undesired interference.
qEngineering
Step: Which engineering steps are covered by the studies?
In Section 1.1.2, we distinguish the four engineering steps of specification, design, implementation, and assurance. Most of our work focuses on studies allocated to the design and assurance steps of this process. Several studies cover at least three steps and describe the transitions between them. [Basir 2010; Delange et al. 2009; Delmas et al. 2015 Delmas et al. , 2017 Denney and Pai 2013b; Dias and Iyoda 2011; Gobbo and Mili 2001; Kehren et al. 2004; Kelly 2006; Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Lopez-Jaquero et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2009; Mueller and D'Andrea 2012; Netkachova et al. 2015; Steiner and Rushby 2011; Zeng et al. 2016 ] Automotive [Antonino and Trapp 2014; da Penha et al. 2015; Dardar et al. 2012; de Oliveira et al. 2015; Domis et al. 2009; Ebnenasir and Cheng 2007; Gallina 2014; Hocking et al. 2014; Konrad et al. 2004; Lin et al. 2016; Luo et al. 2017a; Martorell et al. 2016; Nasser et al. 2017; Oertel et al. 2014; Owda and Obermaisser 2015; Palin and Habli 2010; Pont 2003; Rupanov et al. 2012; Sljivo et al. 2015; Standish et al. 2014; Trindade et al. 2014; Wagner et al. 2010 [Fayad et al. 2003; Lakhani and Pont 2012; Lin and Shen 2015; Murugesan et al. 2015; Pont and Banner 2004; Preschern et al. 2014a; Sun 2014; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2015] Networks & telecommunication [Giuntini et al. 2017; Petroulakis et al. 2016; Saridakis 2002 Saridakis , 2003 Process & power plants [Larrucea et al. , 2016 Mahemoff et al. 2001; Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2015; Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Wilson 1992] Generic [Alho and Rauhamäki 2011; Armoush 2010; Armoush et al. 2008a Armoush et al. ,b, 2009 Baleani et al. 2003; Bozzano et al. 2013; Chen and May 2016; Crenshaw et al. 2006; Denney and Pai 2013a; Grunske 2003; Habli and Kelly 2010; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2008; Islam and Devarakonda 1996; Kabir and Goswami 2015; Kelly and McDermid 1998; Knight 2012; Liu et al. 2008; Luo et al. 2016; Mayo 2006; Natarajan et al. 2000; Preschern et al. 2014b Preschern et al. , 2013a Randell 1975; Weaver 2003] Two studies bridge the gap between specification and implementation: Oertel et al. [2014] note that conventional arguments that an implementation fulfills a safety specification are often based on matching fault trees and test results with this specification. The authors employ fault-injection and model checking against safety contracts and, this way, cover the four considered engineering steps. Trindade et al. [2014] show how formalized safety requirements help transforming a system design into a new design enhanced with safety mechanisms.
Several studies discuss the transition from specification over design to assurance: Gobbo and Mili [2001] describe a refinement-based approach to deriving fault-tolerant specifications of flight control systems. Assurance is achieved by maintaining relational refinement across specification and design steps. Knight [2012, Ch. 6 and 11] provides a comprehensive treatment of the specification, design, and assurance steps of the software dependability life cycle. Particularly, he discusses designs (e.g. Nmodular redundancy) reducing the negative impact of degradation faults on software dependability, designs (e.g. recovery blocks) and procedures (e.g. N-version programming) for improving software fault-tolerance, and the creation of rigorous arguments. Further discussions that relate specification, design, and assurance are provided by Antonino and Trapp [2014] , Cimatti et al. [2015] , Domis et al. [2009], Hauge and Stølen [2013] , Sorokos et al. [2016] , Wilson [1992] , and Wu et al. [2013] .
qCategory: Which categories of patterns are presented?
Among the categories introduced in Section 1.1.3, our work concentrates on designs and arguments. However, more than half of the studies cover at least two of the considered categories. Table 4 lists studies representing these categories. [Konrad et al. 2004; Mahemoff et al. 2001; Miller et al. 2009; Sljivo et al. 2015] Behavioral hazards & accidents [Havârneanu et al. 2015; Lin and Shen 2015; Murugesan et al. 2015; Napolano et al. 2015; Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2014; Riera et al. 2014; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2009 ] Generic technical defects (mainly random, in hardware) [Armoush 2010; Armoush et al. 2008a; Baleani et al. 2003; Chen and May 2016; Delmas et al. 2017; Grunske 2003; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2008; Kehren et al. 2004; Knight 2012; Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Mueller and D'Andrea 2012; Orlic 2007; Preschern et al. 2014b Preschern et al. , 2013a Randell 1975; Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2015; Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Saridakis 2002; Tan et al. 2015] High complexity [Ebnenasir and Cheng 2007; Jackson 2001; Kelly 2006; Kelly and McDermid 1998; Lakhani and Pont 2012; Lin et al. 2016; Ljungkrantz et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2016; Martorell et al. 2016; Miller et al. 2009; Palin and Habli 2010; Pont 2001; Radermacher et al. 2013; Sljivo et al. 2017; Sorokos et al. 2016 ] Undesired interference & mixed criticality [Althammer et al. 2008; Kehren et al. 2004; Larrucea et al. , 2016 Larrucea et al. , 2015 Netkachova et al. 2015; Orlic 2007; Owda and Obermaisser 2015; Rauhamäki et al. 2013; Tan et al. 2015] Security threats [Castellanos et al. 2013; Cimatti et al. 2015; Nasser et al. 2017; Netkachova et al. 2015; Petroulakis et al. 2016; Preschern et al. 2013b ] Argument flaws [Gleirscher and Carlan 2017; Mayo 2006; Rich et al. 2007; Standish et al. 2014] At system-level (from several technologies) [Delmas et al. 2015; Giuntini et al. 2017; Islam and Devarakonda 1996; Kabir and Goswami 2015; Luo et al. 2017a; Petroulakis et al. 2016; Steiner and Rushby 2011] We found two works that cover four of the categories. Kehren et al. [2004] present a statemachine based approach to the generic modeling of safety functions for the refinement of a class of component architectures. They discuss the automatic proof of properties of these functions and, by refinement, of all architectures enhanced by these functions, using a linear temporal logic model checker. The authors demonstrate their method with an architecture using cold redundancy. Domis et al. [2009] show a concept for achieving traceability of safety information (i.e., argumentation evidence) throughout a component-based safety engineering life cycle. Component fault trees derived from hazard analysis provide the core structure for deriving safety requirements (e.g. by hazard negation) and for constructing the safety argument by modifying the original fault trees. This approach is exemplified by integrating a safety limiter into an automotive braking controller.
Notable are also the following studies covering three of the categories: Using a railway interlocking system as an example, Hauge and Stølen [2013] explain a method for the systematic development of safety concepts. For demonstration, the authors describe the integration of redundancy into this system. During typical safety engineering steps (i.e., elicit functional requirements, elicit safety requirements, establish design basis, establish safety case), appropriate safety patterns are selected, instantiated, and composed. The patterns instantiated throughout these steps are then synthesized into a "composite pattern solution." Given a library of safety mechanisms and a software safety requirement, Trindade et al. [2014] show how a given software implementation can be automatically enhanced by a safety mechanism such that the safety requirement is fulfilled. To increase the level of reuse in safety-critical systems engineering, propose a structure for a safety pattern database using contract methodology [Meyer 1992 ]. Several studies bridge the gap between two categories: Gobbo and Mili [2001] show how requirements specifications can be formally refined into conceptual designs. For safety-related design tactics, Grunske [2003] presents a catalog of architectural transformations with the goal of hardening software architectures according to these tactics. Given an architectural decomposition, Delmas et al. [2015 Delmas et al. [ , 2017 automate the identification of enhancements of this decomposition to meet safety requirements. Along the lines of Kehren et al. [2004] , these enhancements incorporate design principles (e.g. redundancy) used for "hardening" of an architecture. The authors identify parameters forming a design space and use SMT solvers to find best solutions to the corresponding constraint satisfaction problem. Similar to the approach of Domis et al. [2009] , Getir et al. [2018] demonstrate how corresponding architecture/fault-tree pairs can be automatically co-evolved-for a specific set of modeling operations-using coupled model transformations. Getir et al.'s approach can be combined with transformations for architecture hardening as discussed by Grunske [2003] .
The relationship between specifications and arguments (Section 1.1.6) is discussed in [Antonino and Trapp 2014; Basir 2010; Kotonya and Sommerville 1997; Sljivo et al. 2015] . Both aspects of designs, behaviors and decompositions, receive a treatment in the works of Mahemoff et al. [2001] ; Mueller and D'Andrea [2012] ; Rauhamäki and Kuikka [2015] ; Rauhamäki et al. [2012] ; Sun et al. [2010] . The transition between a system decomposition and the construction of a safety argument is taken account of by Chen and May [2016] ; Knight [2012] ; Larrucea et al. [2016] ; Netkachova et al. [2015] ; Preschern et al. [2013a] ; Sun et al. [2010] ; Wu and Kelly [2004] . Several authors discuss both arguments and procedures in a reusable context [Kelly 2006; Lin and Shen 2015; Mayo 2006; Netkachova et al. 2015; Palin and Habli 2010] . [Oertel et al. 2014] , 11: [Preschern et al. 2013b] , 12: [Preschern et al. 2013a] , 13: [Rauhamäki et al. 2012 ], 14: [Sljivo et al. 2017] , 15: [Wu et al. 2011] 2.5 qPattern: Which patterns are discussed?
The Tables 5 and 6 relate frequently discussed specifications, arguments, and designs with the tactics they rely on. The tables contain information about the abstraction and whether the pattern is associated with a behavioral constraint as explained in Section 1.1. We also indicate relationships such as generalizes in Table 5 and supported-by in Table 6 . We do not focus cases where one pattern uses another one, for example, if a distributed architecture uses a safety kernel. However, readers interested in further details about these and further relationships may consult the references given in the tables, particularly, Palin and Habli [2010] ; Preschern et al. [2013a] ; Rauhamäki et al. [2012] .
The following analysis addresses the questions qEngineering Step, qAbstraction, qCategory, and qModel from Table 1. The column "References" in the Tables 5 and 6 recommends works providing more detailed explanations of the listed patterns.
Specifications. Antonino and Trapp [2014] discuss the issue of inconsistencies between safety concepts and architecture designs. It is difficult to keep assurance artifacts (e.g. as defined in ISO 26262) up to date and safety concepts consistent with an evolving architecture. The authors [Larrucea et al. 2016] , 26: , 27: [Lin and Shen 2015] , 28: [Palin and Habli 2010] , 29: [Rich et al. 2007 ], 30: [Sorokos et al. 2016] , 31: [Sun et al. 2011] , 32: [Weaver 2003 ], 33: [Yuan and Xu 2010] propose (i) a safety concept decomposition pattern and (ii) parametrized safety concept specification templates. An example of a power sliding door module illustrates their approach. Antonino et al. [2015] propose a procedural pattern for decomposing safety requirements such that traceability to an architectural design and a fault propagation model (i.e., fault trees) is established to perform complete and consistent hazard mitigation. The authors describe traceability between safety requirements, functional and technical architecture, and fault trees. Oertel et al. [2014] investigate checking of safety requirements using formalized contracts (Section 1.1) expressed through property patterns translated into LTL and applied in the VIS checker for MatLab/Stateflow models. The authors determine fault combinations, injected into these models, resulting in a contract violation and demonstrate this idea for an automotive light manager.
Decompositions (and Transformations). For a given decomposition, Grunske [2003] proposes transformations for many of the software and hardware patterns listed in Table 5 . These transformations can be applied to a decomposition resulting in a safety-enhanced decomposition implementing one or more of the principles, for example, substitution, checking, redundancy, recovery. These principles aim at improving safety, that is, by reducing hazard probabilities. The transformations aim at handling three types of component faults: unavailability, faulty reactions, and timing deviations. Grunske [2003] discusses patterns for fault avoidance and for fault containment (Table 5) . He proposes to refine these patterns with patterns for fault detection (i.e., watchdog, integrity check, and the actuation monitor, see also [Rauhamäki et al. 2012] ). Rauhamäki et al. [2012] discuss hardware and software design patterns for control and safety system development. They describe separated safety as their main pattern as well as productive safety (a pattern for high-level safe system behavior), separated override, de-energized override, safety limiter (a pattern for preventive safety actions), and hardwired safety. Each of the latter refines the separated safety pattern (see Table 5 ). Rauhamäki et al. sketch structural and behavioral details of their patterns. Of particular interest is their interdisciplinary discussion to capture reusable knowledge beyond the domain of software design. Preschern et al. [2013a] summarize decomposition patterns of fault-tolerant systems in safetycritical applications. They identify safety tactics (Section 2.7) underlying each pattern, construct product-based safety arguments to understand how the pattern implements these tactics (e.g. replication redundancy), and establish relationships (e.g. is-similar-to, refines) between these patterns. The patterns they discuss are listed in Table 5 . A component model describes the design underlying each pattern. Graphs represent the safety tactics. GSN diagrams convey arguments that a specific pattern implements a specific safety tactic and, therefore, meets the top-level claim "the system maintains its safety functionality" in an appropriate context.
Arguments. Hawkins and Kelly [2009] explore a way to establish confidence for software safety arguments. They observe that certainty about claims made by a software safety argument cannot be reached. However, sufficient confidence about these claims is required and assurance deficits arising from uncertainties have to be made explicit (cf. [Kelly 1997]) . The authors apply deviation-style analysis (i.e., HazOp) to identify assurance deficits and determine importance and impact of each deficit. They present five GSN patterns (cf. Table 6 ). Palin and Habli [2010] describe how safety cases can justify automotive safety using a vehicle safety argument and 12 low-level patterns (cf. Table 6 ). They combine their patterns using "supported by" and "in context of" links. They apply their approach to an automotive start/stop system instantiating the risk management argument and the risk mitigation argument patterns. Their pattern catalog aims at the reuse of arguments and the integration of design and safety activities.
qAbstraction: Which technologies are abstracted by the patterns?
To understand the abstraction of the patterns and their applicability, we classify them into three technology domains: software, electrical and electronic hardware, and mechanical hardware. Software includes programs and data structures. Electrical and electronic hardware includes electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic components (e.g. micro-processors, network and communication hardware, field-programmable gate arrays). Mechanical hardware includes, for example, metal frameworks, hydraulics, and gear technology.
Models of safety concepts that abstract from several technology domains and coherently integrate these domains are useful for the evaluation of safety with respect to the system perimeter (Section 1.1.5). The range of technologies a model of a safety concept covers corresponds to the abstraction available to reason about safety. In summary, multi-domain abstractions make it easier to reason about safety as a behavioral constraint [Leveson 2012] .
Several studies discuss their approaches by covering all three technology domains [Dardar et al. 2012 
qTactic: Which tactics are incorporated by the patterns?
We classified the patterns according to tactic taxonomies. These taxonomies help relating dependability principles as recommended by standards, for example, fault-tolerance measures in IEC 61508. Motivated by such standards, Wu and Kelly [2004] elaborated a design tactic taxonomy later refined by Preschern et al. [2013c] . Figure 2 arranges these and further tactics into an extended design tactics taxonomy. Additionally, the taxonomy of argument patterns by Luo et al. [2016] distinguishes product-based, process-based, compliance, and confidence arguments.
The following works include a comparison of fault avoidance, detection, and containment principles: [Armoush 2010; Basir 2010; Knight 2012; Larrucea et al. 2016; Liu et al. 2008; Mahemoff et al. 2001; Orlic 2007; Palin and Habli 2010; Preschern et al. 2014b Preschern et al. , 2013a Wu and Kelly 2004] . These studies helped us to validate the relationships in Figure 2 . Table 7 points to studies for the more general principles (framed in boxes in Figure 2 ).
qRelationship: How are the patterns and tactics related to each other?
Figure 2 depicts important relationships that generally hold between the tactics:
• Solid arcs indicate that one tactic fully realizes another tactic and dashed arcs that one tactic partially realizes another tactic.
• Solid black arcs denote the generalizes relationship between the tactics inherited from Preschern et al.
[2013c]; Wu and Kelly [2004] .
• Solid green arcs signify relationships identified as a result of the survey.
• Dashed black arcs indicate relationships that either include general principles or express indicate multiple inheritance. Decompositions, Behaviors, and Specifications. Table 5 lists studies providing an overview of designs used in safety engineering. The column "Fail-safe/fail-over" indicates that designs are related to general behaviors through the tactics they incorporate. However, missing from many studies is a model (e.g. a state machine) describing the impact of the corresponding designs on system-level properties (e.g. a behavioral constraint in form of a temporal logic formula).
If one of the designs in Table 5 is chosen to enhance a (component of a) system towards safety then, during assurance, we need to be able to answer how the safety of this system is impacted by this design. Given the terminology in Section 1.1.2, using such a design requires several claims to be substantiated, for example, that the design improves the reliability of the system's components, that the design improves the reliability of the whole system, or that the design improves the safety of the whole system. If these patterns can be represented by behaviors then they can be verified against the safety specification.
As summarized in Figure 2 and accommodating Leveson's framework, behavioral constraints represent the most general tactic to represent safe states of systems in their operational environment. This principle can be decomposed according to Figure 2 , for example, into fault detection (e.g. condition monitoring, limiters) and containment tactics (e.g. recovery).
Decompositions and Arguments. The fail-safe principle (Section 1.1.3) incoporates the ability of a system to maintain or achieve a safe state in case of failure, for example, by shutting down the system or certain functions of it (fail-silent) or by reconfiguring a systems' internal operational state (fail-operational). This principle can, for example, be realized by redundancy, recovery, masking, and barrier. From the studies mentioned in Section 2.7, we know that condition monitoring is usually combined with redundancy, recovery, and masking to design effective safety concepts. Table 6 provides examples of argument patterns (e.g. decomposition arguments, argument modules), classifies them according to their abstraction, their type [Luo et al. 2016] , and whether their top-level claim contains a safety constraint (e.g. a contract). Furthermore, the table indicates relationships to design tactics (e.g. passive and preventive safety).
Specifications and Arguments. Specification patterns support the specification of behavioral constraints, particularly, safety contracts. Design patterns deal with the behavioral and structural decomposition according to specific decomposition criteria (e.g. separation). Of interest to overall safety-as indicated in Figure 1 -is to establish the argument that the safety-enhanced design fulfills the safety specification. For example, Sljivo et al. [2017] show, based on safety contracts, how specifications and assurance arguments can be related and composed.
qContract: Which behaviors are guaranteed by the patterns?
The analysis in Figure 2 results in behavioral constraints usually being a combination of failsafety (both, fail-silent and fail-operational), prevention (e.g. by obstacle avoidance or emergency braking), protection (e.g. by limiters or airbags), non-interference (e.g. by interlocking), and stabilization (e.g. stability control of vehicle dynamics). The prevention (particularly, vigilance check and obstacle avoidance) and limiter tactics usually cover mechanical hardware with their abstractions.
The safety specification may more or less directly refer to the risk class to be handled, for example, behavioral hazards, undesired interference, and technical defects (cf. Section 2.2). If a safety-enhanced decomposition integrates one of the patterns, we expect the behavior of this decomposition to fulfill the safety specification.
Formal methods have proven to be very useful for the mathematical study of whether a design fulfills a safety specification, that is, a specific behavioral constraint. Formal models of patterns along this paradigm are discussed by Antonino et al. 
qSecurity: How is security addressed in the studies?
Several of the surveyed works discuss security as a safety-critical system property, particularly, undesired interactions between safety and security, hazardous influences of security on safety or vice versa.
Property Specification. Relating security to other system properties, Knight [2012, Ch. 2.7.4] observes that "security is inherently a composite" property whereas safety is discussed as a special aspect of dependability dealing with technical defects with severe consequences. With their pattern, suggest that contracts as a specification style can be used to specify both safety and security properties. Radermacher et al. [2013] propose a meta-model facilitating the assignment of security and safety properties to decomposition patterns. Mixed-criticality encompasses interactions of safety and security, such as mentioned by . Asnar et al. [2011] present a modeling and specification framework for security requirements that have to be verified for safety-critical distributed information systems.
Computing Architecture and Technology. Zalewski [2001] explains possibilities of intrusion into a control computer. Althammer et al. [2008] describe a distributed multi-level security architecture and summarize how their approach realizes modular safety case construction including security arguments. Wu et al. [2011] indicate how separation properties of a safety kernel are derived from information system security mechanisms. Littlewood and Rushby [2012] justify that the monitoring of 1-out-of-2 designs can indirectly mitigate consequences of certain security attacks. Larrucea et al. [2015] discuss secure memory access in a commercial-off-the-shelf processor. Additionally, Larrucea et al. [2016] support the combined handling of safety, security, and real-time aspects through separation mechanisms of a network-on-chip design pattern. Cimatti et al. [2015] describe a fail-safe concept called fail-secure whose task is to bring a failed system to a state without enabling security breaches. The authors demonstrate how their pattern can be automatically proven against safety/security contracts. Nasser et al. [2017] exploit security attacks-for example, denial-of-service and resource exhaustion-to introduce critical faults forcing a system into its safe state. Nasser et al. observe that safety mechanisms are perfect attack surfaces for such attacks.
Moreover, investigations by Aven [2007] ; Eames and Moffett [1999] ; Novak and Gerstinger [2010] suggest that undesired interactions can occur in both directions, i.e., security attacks can not only create safety hazards but safety measures can also result in security vulnerabilities. Because of the increasing complexity and connectivity of control software, such interactions could be reduced by integrated safety/security concepts.
Engineering Process and Transformations. Hill and Victor [2008] consider security as a part of the "Product Engineering Class" of their "software safety risk taxonomy. " Kreiner [2015] explains an architecture management procedure applicable to handle both safety and security. Preschern et al. [2014b] compare several safety development methods highlighting how three of them support a combined view of safety and security: the "Safe Control Systems" method [Hauge and Stølen 2013], a method for the development of trusted applications for resource constrained embedded systems , and a method by the authors themselves [Preschern et al. 2013b] as described later. Castellanos et al. [2013] present an approach to the transformation of a given safety-critical architecture into a security-enhanced architecture. They demonstrate their approach by transforming an architecture model such that separation properties are fulfilled.
Argumentation. Preschern et al. [2013b] extend their catalog of decomposition patterns (Table 5 , Preschern et al. [2013a] ) by product-based security arguments that disclose how typical vulnerabilities could threaten implementations of these decompositions. These arguments refine a generic argument structured according to a security analysis of the decomposition. For demonstration, they apply the STRIDE 3 analysis [Shostack 2014 ] to identify threats using data flow diagrams and add an argument against all identified threats. The authors explain their approach using a substation automation device case study from the railway domain. This work integrates safety and security by taking into account, at a pattern level, how security threats could negatively influence safety properties. Netkachova et al. [2015] describe an approach to identify interactions between security and safety and to resolve conflicts leading to a security-informed safety case. propose a modular argument for a mixed-criticality design pattern.
2.11 qModel: Which models are used to describe the patterns? Table 8 lists studies according to the modeling paradigm (e.g. relational, propositional, transition system) and the modeling language (e.g. UML, GSN) they use to present their approaches.
qContribution: To what extent are known challenges covered by the studies?
Inspired from discussions by Cant [2013] ; Graydon [2015 Graydon [ , 2017 ; Knauss et al. [2017] ; Langari and Maibaum [2013] ; Laplante et al. [2007] , we comment on some practical challenges we expect to be addressed by research on safety concepts and assurance cases.
2.12.1 Risk Identification and Classification. Near-injectivity of Risk Classifiers. Cant [2013, p. 4] points to an issue with risk classifiers (Section 1.1.1) also well-known from other domains [Jarrett Relational (e.g. B, Z) [Delmas et al. 2017; Gobbo and Mili 2001; Sun 2014; Sun et al. 2010 ] Propositional (e.g. temporal logic) [Basir 2010; Dias and Iyoda 2011; Kehren et al. 2004; Miller et al. 2009; Orlic 2007; Petroulakis et al. 2016; Steiner and Rushby 2011; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2015; Trindade et al. 2014] HOL (e.g. PVS, Maude) [Dias and Iyoda 2011; Steiner and Rushby 2011; Sun et al. 2010] Transition system, event structure (e.g. AltaRica, Event-B) [Ball and Butler 2009; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2008; Kabir and Goswami 2015; Kehren et al. 2004; Lin and Shen 2015; Lopez-Jaquero et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2009; Nasser et al. 2017; Orlic 2007; Pereverzeva et al. 2012; Randell 1975; Tan et al. 2015] Petri net [Belli and Großpietsch 1991; Flammini et al. 2014 ] Probabilistic (e.g. Bayesian network) [Armoush 2010; Armoush et al. 2008a; Bateman and Hatton 2006; Chen and May 2016; Delmas et al. 2017; Denney et al. 2012; Kramer et al. 2012; Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Peng and Zhiqiang 2013; Zeng et al. 2016] Differential equation [Mueller and D' Andrea 2012] Structure, flow decomposition (e.g. fault, signal, data, material) [Alho and Rauhamäki 2011; Armoush 2010; Armoush et al. 2008a; Baleani et al. 2003; Bozzano et al. 2013; Delmas et al. 2015; Domis et al. 2009; Grunske 2003; Knight 2012; Liu et al. 2008; Luo et al. 2017a; Mahemoff et al. 2001; Nasser et al. 2017; Natarajan et al. 2000; Pont and Banner 2004; Preschern et al. 2014b Preschern et al. , 2013c Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2015; Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Tan et al. 2009 ] Pattern meta-model, tactic taxonomy [Khalil et al. 2014; Luo et al. 2016; Preschern et al. 2013c; Radermacher et al. 2013 Kelly and McDermid 1998; Larrucea et al. 2016; Lin and Shen 2015; Luo et al. 2016; Mayo 2006; Netkachova et al. 2015; Palin and Habli 2010; Preschern et al. 2013a,b; Sljivo et al. 2017; Sorokos et al. 2016; Weaver 2003] and Westcott 2010] of risk analysis: "different probability/severity pairs can be equated as having the same level of risk. " 4 We formally sketch this problem for the inclined reader: Let a, b : R with a < b, Ev the set of all critical events, e ∈ Ev, Pr(e) : [0, 1] the probability of occurrence of e, Sev(e) : [a, b] a severity of consequence measure for e, and a map RL :
Each natural number can be assigned a set of directives for risk handling, for example, an automotive safety integrity level (SIL) according to ISO 26262. RL encodes a domain-specific decision table that partitions the combinations of Pr and Sev and maps e to the risk level according to this partitioning. A rather simple way of risk classification, for example, sometimes used in FMEA, is to multiply Pr with Sev and map the result into an ordered scale.
However, for n ∈ N, the inverse RL −1 (n) can represent risk equivalence classes
being undesirably heterogeneous in their constitution, like pointed out by Cant [2013] . For two fairly different risks of the same equivalence class, safety analysts could make similar decisions about risk handling and safety engineers could follow similar directives for risk handling. Such decisions and directives can involve, for example, the use of specific safety patterns and specific parameters to instantiate these patterns. In the worst case, risks strongly differing in their Pr and Sev values are handled using the same design and argument patterns where they should not. The surveyed studies neither address this issue nor do they provide information on how often it occurs in safety practice.
2.12.2 Risk Reduction and Assessment. Architecture Hardening, Integrity Level Decomposition. Hazard analysis drives the choice and design of safety concepts, particularly, the enhancement of a given system with instances of such concepts. As described above, hazard analysis includes risk classification and the assignment of SILs to critical items, that is, the whole system or its functions, channels, or components. SILs represent safety requirements to be fulfilled by such items. Consequently, SIL assignment corresponds to specification, and demonstrating that an item achieves a certain SIL corresponds to assurance argumentation. Standards such as ISO 61508 and ISO 26262 provide descriptions of SILs and, furthermore, suggest decomposition schemes for SILs according to fault tolerance tactics (e.g. redundancy). This shows how safety requirements decomposition is driven by certain tactics (Figure 2 ). Usually defined for electronic and mechanical hardware items, some standards (e.g. IEC 61508) also provide SIL classifications for software items. In this context, risk reduction involves two main questions: First, for architecture hardening, given an item S known to have SIL x, does the transformation of S into S P using a decomposition pattern P lead to a level x P of S P strictly higher than x? For example, Grunske [2003] and Delmas et al. [2017] investigate the idea of transforming an architecture model by instantiating a safety pattern and synthesizing a hardened architecture. Second, for integrity level decomposition, given an item S assigned SIL x and decomposing S into S 1 ⊗ P S 2 by applying a decomposition pattern P, can the SILs of S 1 and S 2 be reduced to levels x 1 and x 2 strictly lower than x? This last question leads to assumptions to be made about the context of S and to requirements to be verified of S 1 and S 2 and their composition by ⊗ P .
Alignment of Risks with Safety Functions. System-level hazards are defined to have an impact on the system's environment. Whether or not such hazards are caused by component failure, studies about behavior patterns discuss what Cant [2013] describes as "safety functionality in terms of the system interface. " He states that "hazard analysis is inward-looking, making it hard to describe safety functionality in terms of the system interface. " Certainly, hazard analysis should help with the identification of safety requirements both at system and component level and with decisions on the safety concepts to be used. We believe that hazard analysis based on behavior models can improve the identification of safety requirements at the system interface and, thus, improve the verification of the absence of system-level hazards. For example, Mahemoff et al. [2001] discuss patterns capturing "safety-usability" for interface designs and Murugesan et al. [2015] elaborate an extensible state machine pattern suitable for identifying and reducing mode confusions.
Certifiable Testing of High Automation. Knauss et al. [2017] empirically identify challenges in automated vehicle testing, particularly, (i) the practical need of improved safety standards, (ii) simple integrated models for deriving complete and sound test suites, and (iii) the avoidance of re-certification. We extend their investigation with the impact of safety design patterns on these challenges. For example, product-based argument patterns can be a complement to compliance arguments backed by procedural standards (i), design patterns can simplify test suite decomposition through reuse (ii) and, moreover, reduce the fragility of safety certificates (e.g. by argument modules and by using the separation tactic; iii).
Avoidance of Safety Antipatterns. Brown et al. [1998] discuss general antipatterns in software engineering management and Laplante et al. [2007] ; Laplante and Neill [2005] transfer these ideas to various domains. For example, El-Attar and Miller [2006] apply antipatterns to software specification based on use cases and Moha et al. [2012] apply antipatterns in architecture analysis. However, we are unable to find studies identifying "worst practices" in a safety-related context.
2.12.3 Argumentation. Objectivity of Risk Analysis. To reduce confirmation bias in an argument, Leveson [2011] proposes to negate the assurance claim. The integration of hazard analysis techniques in the argumentation process can reduce this problem, for example, fault tree analysis (see, e.g. Oertel et al. [2014] ) helps to identify how an undesired top-level event could possibly occur and argue from (reusable) countermeasures (see, e.g. Gleirscher and Carlan [2017] ). The negated assurance claim would require an iterative argumentation process with risk reduction after each iteration and a corresponding update of the argument. This update would consist in the weakening of the claim and the pruning of the evidence for the mitigated hazard from the argument. This process stops if no further evidence for substantiating the negated claim can be found, the claim is ultimately weakened, and all existing evidence has been removed.
Enrichment of Process-based Arguments by Product-based Arguments. Graydon et al. [2007] propose the on-the-fly construction of assurance evidence during development. Other studies discuss traceability (i) between evidence and assurance claims by building safety arguments from architecture models and component fault trees [Domis et al. 2009; Sorokos et al. 2016] and (ii) between counter-evidence and assurance claims by obstructing safety arguments through fault injection and propagation and obtaining fault trees from computed cut-sets [Oertel et al. 2014] . Basir [2010] attaches meaning to assurance arguments by using natural deduction and, this way, indicates how inconsistencies during integration of evidence can be disclosed by theorem proving.
Validity of Assurance Assumptions and Models. Argument confidence (e.g. completeness, soundness) is relying on the validity of the models of the system under argumentation and its environment and on the chosen abstraction. Sun et al. [2011] demonstrate how to justify the validity of hazard analysis results to be employed in an argument. In the maintenance of safety-critical electronic hardware (i.e., prognostics and health management), Zio [2016] discusses opportunities of using data from hardware health monitoring sensors for the assessment and usage of predictive models.
Unambiguity, Soundness, and Completeness of Arguments. Formalization is known for the reduction of ambiguities, the support of automation, and the evaluation of consistency of claims. However, it is still unclear whether [Rushby 2010] or not [Graydon 2015] , and to what extent formalism in arguments can increase their confidence. In any case, the contract templates from Antonino and Trapp [2014] could be formalized and assessed against completeness criteria. Luo et al. [2017b] present a tool for confidence assessment of arguments (based on degree-of-beliefs) without the necessity of having a formal design model of the system. Their approach seems useful in the construction of abstract arguments to be re-assessed once such models are available.
Readability, Reduction of Complexity, and Maintainability of Arguments. For example, Despotou and Kelly [2008] and Kelly [2006] apply decomposition criteria from architecture design to modularize assurance arguments. While GSN has been standardized and shown to be useful for the representation of arguments (Section 2.11), Denney and Pai [2013a, 2016] and Matsuno [2014] provide formalizations of the GSN syntax to support composable GSN-based patterns and to support automated consistency checking for argument construction and maintenance. We believe, their decomposition and consistency checking could make use of behavior models of the system under argumentation. This was shown in goal-oriented and model-based requirements engineering (e.g. [van Lamsweerde 2009] ) and in contract-based software and systems engineering (e.g. [Broy 2011; Meyer 1992] ). Studies such as, for example, Armoush [2010] ; Basir [2010] ; Orlic [2007] ; Sun et al. [2010] also discuss this direction. Overall, correctness proofs based on behavior models could help justify the decomposition of the corresponding GSN arguments. Using behavior models with formal contracts would allow arguments to scale up to the assurance of large systems.
DISCUSSION
The Sections 3.1 to 3.7 present our findings and suggestions for future research based on the survey results. In Section 3.8, we discuss validity threats from literature search and systematic mapping with a potential impact on the quality of this survey and describe our measures to minimize these threats. Section 3.9 summarizes our experiences with the survey method.
Findings and Suggestions from Systematic Mapping
The applications discussed in the studies cover many areas of safety-critical embedded control systems. Patterns are presented at different stages during the system life cycle ranging from earlystage requirements engineering (e.g. [Stålhane and Myklebust 2016] ) and architectural design (e.g. [Rupanov et al. 2012] ) down to implementation and assurance. Several studies capture at least three of the four engineering steps we distinguish. Of all categories, our survey targets design (i.e., behavior, decomposition) and argument patterns. Particularly, the surveyed decomposition patterns cover the whole range of tactics from fault avoidance ("correct by design") and fault detection to fault containment, however, with a clear focus on checking, recovery, and redundancy.
Notations like UML, GSN, and generic component diagrams appear most frequently in the presentations of the concepts. GSN dominates the studies and is discussed as an intuitive way of visualizing arguments. Formalism is rarely used in the studies to assess the concepts.
Overall, we found interesting research towards a solution of each of the listed challenges. However, risk classification, integrity level decomposition, and the identification of antipatterns were discussed the least among the surveyed studies. Only few of the works present validations and practical evaluations based on empirical and formal results.
The surveyed works cover many of the internationally relevant venues for design patterns and for dependability engineering.
We strongly encourage the use of a structured abstract and a standard document template. Document templates used in the studies helped us to evaluate the described patterns and relate them to each other. Templates can also be a first step towards formalization.
Towards a Unified Pattern System
Relationships between design patterns have, for example, been elaborated by Preschern et al. [2013c] . From the studies, we identified further relationships between design and argument patterns as shown in the Tables 5 and 6 .
Several patterns facilitate the abstraction from software, hardware, and mechanical aspects. However, the level of abstraction used in the studies varies strongly. Moreover, the studies suggest that there are several related notions of safety. Formal models would allow the comparison of these notions. Without formalization, relationships (e.g. similarity, equivalence, refinement) between the patterns as well as the meaning of their composition remains unclear.
For example, an integration of the approaches of Rauhamäki et al. [2012] and Sljivo et al. [2017] would require unified notions of a safety function, a safe state, and relationships between the presented patterns. Beyond the identified relationships, refinements between design-time (e.g. hardware platform substitution) and run-time (e.g. multi-channel redundancy with voting) fault prevention [Grunske 2003 ] could help bridging important reasoning steps in assurance arguments. The many country-specific signaling/interlocking practices in the railway domain further motivate unification. Because railway regulation is also accident driven [Havârneanu et al. 2015] , relating these practices and deriving a hierarchy of interlocking patterns could even lead to an exchange of lessons learned (from train accidents) between those countries.
To improve the comparability and unification of patterns, they could be modeled in a common formal framework, for example, based on relations [Stepney et al. 2003 ] or temporal logic [Dwyer et al. 1999] . Such a formal basis could help clarifying and establishing new pattern relationships, such as inheritance, to elaborate pattern variants, and establish proof hierarchies (e.g. envisaged in Marmsoler and Gleirscher [2017] ).
From Tactic Taxonomies to Proof Systems
Tactic taxonomies can be seen as a first step towards a theory of safety concepts. Such a theory could bridge the gap between decomposition tactics [Preschern et al. 2013c; Wu and Kelly 2004] and argumentation tactics [Luo et al. 2016] and comprise a framework for the construction of verifiable safety arguments. According to Rushby's classification of critical properties [Rushby 1994 [Rushby , 2010 , a taxonomy can foster reuse in the verification of how safety design patterns contribute to safety. A taxonomy can, moreover, identify the role these patterns play in high-confidence argumentation.
Many of the decomposition patterns are also known as reliability patterns. Data in Gleirscher and Nyokabi [2018] suggests that practitioners are aware of the subtle differences between safety and reliability. This distinction has not been rigorously clarified in the studies, including the pattern catalogs [Grunske 2003; Preschern et al. 2013a] . However, in Section 1.1.8, we distinguish between safety as a strong property and reliability as a weaker, more general property.
Safety, reliability, and security can be formulated as behavioral properties of a system, as explained in Section 1.1.7. Hence, a framework based on Figure 2 would be helpful to verify how safetyenhanced designs fulfill a given set of behavioral constraints, that is, a safety specification (Figure 1 ).
Inspired from discussions by Broy [2011] and Rushby [2011] , verification results (e.g. safety integrity level or, more generally, property decomposition and preservation) could be lifted to the pattern level and, this way, form a pattern-based proof system.
Argumentation by Contract Verification
The view of safety as a behavioral property (Section 1.1.1) not necessarily related to system failure is rarely discussed in the studies. In the light of safety as a behavioral property [Leveson 2012 ], many of the design patterns we surveyed are missing a corresponding contract (Section 1.1.3) that allows to reason [Rushby 2010 [Rushby , 2011 about how a design impacts safety and reduces hazards. Instead, safety often seems to stay implicit in a pattern application.
For the construction of high-confidence arguments, the use of behavior models could help connect designs and arguments. Moreover, formal models could be used to clarify the semantics of certain parts of arguments. For example, the work by Basir [2010] shows a fruitful connection between theorem proving and argument construction. Moreover, we believe that the definition of contracts for patterns is necessary for successful reuse and the construction of high-confidence arguments. For example, for safety mechanisms in automotive engineering, mechatronics, and robotics (e.g. anti-lock braking systems, vigilance checks [Hirata and Murakami 2014; Lin and Lin 2011; Utsumi et al. 2013] ), it can be useful to have property specifications (e.g. contracts) as assurance claims.
A fail-safe system is required to not create a hazard on the occurrence of covered failures. What does that mean? What is the considered system perimeter? Can we deduce from a model that failure consequences have actually been covered beyond the requirements? Can we deduce safety of a system in the failed state from this model? We could, for example, do so using a contract that specifies the weakest context. But how much do we need to know about this context to specify safety requirements in form of safety contracts?
Many of the design patterns based on the fail-safe and fail-over tactics (Table 5 ) model decompositions that can be characterized by a corresponding behavior. In fact, some designs combine decomposition and behavior, for example, the "distributed multiple independent levels of security" design is formally modeled and verified against a contract as demonstrated in [Cimatti et al. 2015] . Moreover, Dong et al. [2003] show the possibility of design patterns to be associated with contracts inducing expressions in Milner's Calculus of Communicating Systems [Milner 1995] .
Furthermore, contracts with violation handling (i.e., specifications with assumptions on the environment) could allow critical contract violations to be handled by weakening contracts and instantiating corresponding pairs of patterns and contracts.
This way, the instantiation of a safety pattern for a system can address a violation of the assumption of a contract (e.g. a failure mode of the environment) or a violation of the guarantee of a contract (e.g. a failure mode of the system).
Contracts with violation handling as, for example, formalized by Broy [2011] , can get highly important when system (of systems) complexity boosts latent systematic defects.
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment
It is important to keep track of how low-level hazard analysis impacts design decisions for the overall system and how system-level hazard analysis drives low-level design decisions. Because risk priorities correspond to integrity levels and integrity levels motivate the choice of decompositions, the issue of homogeneous risk classifiers is worthy to be further explored at a pattern level. Injective risk classifiers of the type RL : Ev → N could aid in more distinctive risk handling by providing information about the type of risk beyond just Pr and Sev for classification.
Related to risk classification is the treatment of critical properties of different nature, for example, security and safety, usability and safety, or usability and security. Such properties are usually allocated to various overlapping fragments of a system. Particularly, if interaction cannot be handled by conservative forms of physical separation, the avoidance or handling of undesired interactions between these system fragments forms a safety requirement.
Finally, formalism could also provide evaluation criteria for argument patterns, for example, to identify confirmation bias. For learning from failure, a stronger integration of incident and accident research [Havârneanu et al. 2015] as recommended by Leveson [2012] seems necessary to report on antipatterns and to improve existing safety concepts.
Tools Support for Pattern Systems
Verification frameworks could benefit from process and tool support based on patterns and support safety engineering as an integral part of the system life cycle. The integration with widely known system models and formalisms (particularly, to address cross-disciplinarity) could improve automated construction, semantics-based checking and verification, and maintenance of assurance results. Such approaches would offer tool support for analyzing risk, determining safety integrity levels and, for architecture hardening at scale.
The relationship between assurance arguments [Palin and Habli 2010] and requirements traceability is discussed by Antonino et al. [2015] ; Sljivo et al. [2017] . Beyond traceability models, support for automated traceability is desirable in the construction and maintenance of arguments from evidence (e.g. implementation and verification of countermeasures) towards claims (e.g. system safety requirements).
Empirical Assessment and Standardization of Pattern Use
Although safety patterns represent "best practices" or "proven-in-use" concepts, we do not know whether the discussed patterns fulfill the predicates "best" or "proven. " The examples, case studies, experience reports, and discussions studied help with understanding the approaches and suggest these predicates hold of decomposition patterns more than of argument patterns.
The standard IEC 61508 (part 4) defines proven in use for an element as the demonstration "... that the likelihood of dangerous systematic faults is low enough so that every safety function that uses the element achieves its required safety integrity level. " Ehrenberger [2016] and Schäbe and Braband [2015] discuss the application of stochastic models (here, Poisson processes as proposed by Littlewood [Littlewood 1991]) in the transfer of reliability characteristics between different contexts. Consistently, the standards ISO 26262, IEC 61508, and ISO 61511 refer to techniques such as "field monitoring" to collect statistical evidence for arguments of items to be reused in certification.
For the transfer of the "proven in use" concept to the field of argument patterns, it can be helpful to evaluate how and where the surveyed argument patterns have been practiced and declared as fit for reuse in certification. For this, a database using the structure of Kajtazovic et al.'s approach could be used to register "system elements out of context" (cf. ISO 26262) or other reusable system components. For each item in the database, the contract could store safety properties and a decomposition.
Furthermore, the inclusion of formal safety patterns for specification, design, and assurance in industrial standards could guide the representation of all safety stakeholders' expectations on argument confidence. For example, the design patterns to cover random faults in electronic hardware components in IEC 61508 Parts 2 and 7 (diagnostic techniques and measures) could be extended by corresponding argument and specification patterns.
The relatively low number of validation, evaluation, and experience studies hampers successful knowledge transfer between industry and academia. Although the studies convey interesting results, some studies are, thus, difficult to replicate and transfer. Hence, we stress the necessity to collect evidence on pattern applications from further application domains (e.g. robotics and intelligent autonomous systems) and in form of validation and evaluation works, preferably, controlled experiments using formal methods.
GSN-based assurance cases [Hawkins and Kelly 2009] have received a lot of attention by researchers leading to a body of knowledge ready to be empirically assessed, further integrated with research from other fields (e.g. formal methods, software engineering, reliability engineering), and further transferred into assurance practice (e.g. through stronger inclusion in standards). These observations confirm and generalize Graydon's [Graydon 2015 ] question of sufficient evidence on the quality, properties, and practical effectiveness of formal assurance arguments.
Limitations of the Survey
Our search was focused on patterns, concepts, measures, and mechanisms in the design and assurance of safety-critical systems. The ambivalent meanings of the words "pattern" and "safety" lead to many search results across many domains and disciplines. Differences in the search engines first required us to relax and then constrain the search expressions. For example, we pruned the results by excluding the terms "food, medic, bio, service-oriented architecture, SOA, web. " Moreover, we exclude gray literature and non-peer reviewed literature, but include peer-reviewed and archived literature from the same authors if available. However, we reduced the risk of missing relevant work and outdated search results by snowballing 6 and an update of our search. We eliminate inaccuracies during data extraction, coding, and analysis by discussion, redundant extraction and coding, and cross-checking data samples.
Experiences with Systematic Mapping and Review
Systematic literature reviews [Kitchenham 2007 ] are intended to help with the comparison of similar studies (e.g. replication studies) in a very specific research field and with identifying new research directions in this field.
In our cross-disciplinary case, the effort of a systematic review to compare heterogeneous studies and to identify interesting research directions was too high to justify its benefit. Our main findings could have been identified more easily by relying on one or two databases instead of four and by snowballing. We thus confirm the drawback of high costs as mentioned by Shull et al. [2008, p. 352] . Database search and filter turned out to be a weak instrument for the control of the survey process to quickly converge in a complete selection of coherent studies. Search terms can play a minor role in identifying relevant literature as the search can get unnecessarily wide in case of many synonyms and biased in case of missing synonyms.
From four databases and from duplicate removal, we observe that the gain in relevant studies diminishes with the addition of a third and fourth database. Our experience suggests that after an initial search in one (or two) database(s), traditional manual snowballing seems to be most effective and can be supported by tools 7 and by specific search queries. We have however not taken into account the simplifications for systematic reviews recommended by Kuhrmann et al. [2017] .
The most difficult parts in exploring the literature of a cross-disciplinary field is the identification of an interesting set of survey questions. Such questions typically arise from the review process and often require changes of the search string because new concepts and terms have to be taken into account. This issue necessitates search iteration and strengthens the case for snowballing.
CONCLUSIONS
In this survey, we summarize and evaluate research on reusable design and argumentation concepts for the assurance of system safety. We present relationships between these concepts and derive suggestions for future research. Our work is based on a systematic map to reduce bias, validate search criteria and databases, to track inclusion and exclusion criteria, and to support reproducibility.
We identify a range of reusable concepts. Most of these concepts can be related to the overall aim of not violating safety constraints. The difficulty of effective reuse of these concepts still sustains with the problem that the various notions of system safety are not well integrated. The most relevant notion defines safety as a set of behavioral constraints to be fulfilled by the system when operated in its environment. Additionally, safety of a system in operation depends on the various properties of this system's components. Hence, a reusable safety concept needs to explain how it, when applied in a specific context, provably contributes to the system's safety. However, heterogeneous formalisms hamper the comparison of the concepts across the surveyed studies.
The construction of high-confidence assurance arguments requires precise semantics of these concepts for the analysis of their relationships and for the verification of their composition. Safety concepts could be modeled as pairs of design patterns and safety contracts to facilitate compositional verification of their use, that is, of their instantiation. Studies using formal (e.g. probabilistic) models of these concepts are most promising to meet assurance proof obligations of this kind.
To improve this situation, we identified three interesting research directions: First, the establishment of a body of knowledge unifying the concepts shared between safety assurance, dependability and security engineering, human factors engineering, and system accident research. Second, the formulation of reusable concepts in a common semantic framework. Third, the transfer of this body of knowledge into engineering practice to evaluate the effectiveness of these concepts and gain feedback for research progress.
Future Work. Our survey could be extended for discussing safety and security. Hence, a repetition of our study for security patterns could balance our safety perspective by a security perspective. A similar survey on "security patterns" could help to develop an integrated view of security and safety [Steiner and Liggesmeyer 2013] .
An interesting direction for the development of an improved safety pattern system could be a survey of safety-related antipatterns. This step might have to go along with empirical studies of system safety practice and could take into account more general work on design "patterns" "templates", "models, " "types", "forms", "tactics", or "styles". The survey of gray literature could take into account unpublished but open material from industrial practice.
An extension of the presented tactic taxonomy could be facilitated by additional studies on the reuse of designs and arguments in, for example, robotics and intelligent autonomous systems, public infrastructure automation, building automation in civil engineering, production automation, naval systems, and control systems in construction machinery and utility vehicles.
The classification in Pont and Banner [2004, p. 208] could help with a refined analysis of the questions qPattern, qCategory, qTactic, and qRelationship for software implementation patterns. The authors distinguish between patterns for software foundations, time-triggered architecture for single/multi-processor systems, user-interface components, serial-peripheral library, monitoring and control components, and hardware foundations.
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